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CSE543 - Computer Security

CSE 543: Computer Security Module: Safe Programming



Avoiding Vulnerabilities

- - Prevent memory errors
 - Detect data handling errors (e.g., truncation)







How do we write programs to avoid mistakes that lead to vulnerabilities?

Processing String Input

- of string input
 - Read input into your program
 - read/fread, gets, scanf, and variants
 - Manipulate string data
 - strcpy, strcat, and variants
 - Comparing and converting strings
 - strtok, strcmp, strtol, and variants





Major cause of buffer overflows and other memory errors is the processing



Processing String Input

- What properties would you like to ensure when you read and manipulate strings to prevent memory errors?
 - Should create a buffer containing a string that is within buffer bounds and is null terminated
 - That is, should be a semantically correct C string
 - But, how to check for these properties, how to detect failures, and what to do on failure?
- Many C functions for string processing work slightly differently











Secure Programming HOWTO

- slides
 - Detailed guidance on which C library functions to use and which to avoid And the future of such C library functions
 - - Particularly for string processing
- Following slides are derived from his documentation and slides





See David Wheeler's "Secure Programming HOWTO" documentation and

No Bounds Checking

- Many C library functions do not check bounds Don't use these functions
- Functions
 - gets reads input without checking.
 - strcpy strcpy(dest, src) copies from src to dest
 - If src longer than dest buffer, keeps writing! •
 - strcat strcat(dest, src) appends src to dest
 - If strlen(src)+strlen(dest) longer than buffer, keeps writing! •
 - scanf family of input functions
 - Many options don't control max length (e.g., bare "%s")



No Bounds Checking

- Many C library functions do not check bounds
 - Don't use these functions
- Example: scanf
 - sscanf(input, "%s", target);
 - Moves input to target until null termination of "input"
 - Regardless of length of buffer allocated for "target"
- Such functions (used this way) are inherently unsafe if they receive adversary-controlled input





No Guarantee of Null Term.

- Even functions that provide some degree of bounds checking may fail to guarantee null termination of input
- Consider strncpy
- char *strncpy(char *DST, const char *SRC, size t LENGTH) Copy string of bytes from SRC to DST
- - Up to LENGTH bytes; if less, NIL-fills
- Scenario: Suppose size of buffer DST is LENGTH and size of SRC is also LENGTH
 - then fills buffer DST without null terminator
- In that case, what happens for strlen(DST)?













Two Main Defense Options

- (1) Bounds check or (2) auto-resize buffer
 - Include null-termination
- Bounds checking
 - If reach bound
 - (a) Stop processing •
 - (b) Truncate data •
 - Stop processing can be used for DoS attacks
 - adversary
 - E.g., in middle of multibyte (unicode) character
 - Ideally, we want notification if inputs is truncated





Truncation can lose valuable data or allow adversary to remove data chosen by



Two Main Defense Options

- (1) Bounds check or (2) auto-resize buffer
 - Include null-termination
- Auto-resize
 - If reach bound
 - (a) Create new buffer of desired size
 - This is what most other programming languages do
 - Auto-resize can present some challenges in C/C++ due to manual memory management
 - E.g., When to free a buffer that is no longer large enough to use? •
 - Code gets a bit more complex









- Traditional: strncat, strncpy, sprintf, snprintf
 - First three are hard to use correctly
- strncat/strncpy
 - Lack of guarantee of null termination
 - No report of truncation, should it occur
 - Also, strncpy does dumb things like NULL-fills rest of buffer, incurring often unnecessary overhead







- Traditional: strncat, strncpy, sprintf, snprintf
 - First three are hard to use correctly
- sprintf
 - Use format string to express bounds checks
 - "%.10s" means "<= 10 bytes" (notice ".")</p>
 - "%10s" sets minimum (!) length
 - Or can use "*" to pass bounds value as an argument
 - sprintf(dest, "%.*s", maxlen, src);
 - maxlen holds the maximum bytes to copy (still need ".")
 - Does not appear to ensure null termination
 - Or inform on truncation
- Hard to use all these things correctly







- Traditional: strncat, strncpy, sprintf, snprintf
 - First three are hard to use correctly
- snprintf
 - int snprintf(char *s, size_t n, const char * format, ...);
 - Writes output to buffer "s" up to n chars (bounds check)
 - Always writes \0 at end if n>=1 (null termination)
 - Returns "length that would have been written" or negative if error (enable checking for truncation or errors
- Example
 - len = snprintf(buf, buflen, "%s", original value);
 - if (len < 0 || len >= buflen) ... // handle error/truncation







- and ...
 - Imit the number of bytes read?
 - snprintf reads to end of input string normally
- Can use snprintf with precision specifier
 - len = snprintf(dest, destsize, "%.*s", (int) srcsize, src)
 - if (len < 0 || len >= buflen) ... // handle error/truncation
- Can be a bit quirky though Need the "(int)"





• What if you want to bounds check, null-terminate string, detect truncation,



- Future: more streamlined bounds checking solutions
- strlcpy and strlcat
 - Simpler, full-featured bounds checking
 - Always null-terminates, if dest has any space (have to leave room, but can specify)
 - strlcpy doesn't null-fill, unlike strncpy (good!)
 - Easy to detect if terminates "in the middle"
 - Returns "bytes would have written" like snprintf



Auto-resize Solutions

- Versions of printf that support auto-resize
- asprintf and vasprintf
 - analogous to sprintf and vsprintf, but auto-allocate a new string
- string buffer
- Example
 - char *result;
 - asprintf(&result, "x=%s and y=%s\n", x, y);
- string
 - You will have to free that yourself



• Simple to use and do not terminate results in middle because it resizes the

Allocate memory for "result" based on size of resulting (no pun intended)





Auto-resize Solutions

- scanf family of functions
- Use the "%m" qualifier to allocate buffer dynamically to hold the input
- Example
 - char *result;
 - sscanf(input, "%ms", &result);
- • Again, you must free the auto-allocated memory
 - Only if the sscanf was successful



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Resizing is also supported for other unsafe functions to avoid memory errors

Auto-resize Solutions

- getline function
- Works in a manner analogous to scanf family
 - No qualifier necessary though
- Example
 - FILE *stream;
 - char *line = NULL;
 - size t len = 0;
 - while ((nread = getline(&line, &len, stream)) != -1) {
 - /* operate on "line" */
- Will only auto-allocate when more space is needed



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Resizing is also supported for other unsafe functions to avoid memory errors

String Conversion

- problems
- atoi vs. strtol (and similar)
- atoi just does conversion as best it can
 - has been converted (aka there's no way to detect atoi("123garbage")).

• strtol can record errors

long res = strtol("834592999999999998997", &end, 10); if (errno != 0) { printf("Conversion error, %s\n", strerror(errno)); } else if (*end) { printf("Converted partially: %i, non-convertible part: %s\n", res, end); else { printf("Converted successfully: %i\n", res); }



Converting strings to integers may be prone to integer overflows and other

• The reason for discouraging use of atoi stems from the fact that there is no way to detect if overflow or underflow has occurred, and no way to check if the entire string









Take Away

- Lots of memory errors occur due to sloppy string handling • Even if you think you are doing the right thing (e.g., strncpy and strncat), you
- are prone to flaws
 - Due to truncation and/or lack of null-termination
- No reason to fall victim to simple errors
 - Although still have to compute bounds correctly for checking in some cases
- Should start using safe string handling functions NOW
- Also, use "assert" for error checking







