


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CSE 543: Computer Security Module: Applied Cryptography



Recap of Symmetric Key Cryptography

- Without knowing KI, Eve can't read M
- Without knowing K2, Eve can't compute a valid MAC
- Problem
 - How do Alice and Bob securely share their keys?





Public Key Cryptography

- Public Key cryptography
 - Each key pair consists of a public and private component: k⁺ (public key), k⁻ (private key)

- $D(E(p, k^{-}), k^{+}) = p$
- Public keys are distributed (typically) through public key certificates
 - Anyone can communicate secretly with you if they have your certificate
 - E.g., SSL-based web commerce

- $D(E(p,k^+),k^-) = p$



Diffie-Hellman Key Agreement


- the security community
 - Negotiate a secret over an insecure media
 - E.g., "in the clear" (seems impossible)
 - Idea: participants exchange intractable puzzles that can be solved easily with additional information.

- Mathematics are very deep
 - Working in multiplicative group G

 - Things like RSA are variants that exploit similar properties



• The DH paper really started the modern age of cryptography, and indirectly



Use the hardness of computing discrete logarithms in finite field to make secure



Time for Revisiting Math

- a b
- Prime: an integer greater than I that is divisible by no positive integers other than I and itself
- Greatest Common Divisor: The GCD of two integers a and b is the largest integer n that divides both a and b
 - Denoted gcd(a, b) = n
 - Euclidean algorithm





• Divisibility: an integer a divides b if b = ac for some integer c. This is denoted

• Relatively prime: Two integers a and b are relatively prime if gcd(a,b) = 1











Some Math for Cryptography

- $Z = \{..., -3, -2, -1, 0, 1, 2, 3, ...\}$
- $Z^+ = \{1, 2, 3,\}$
- prime vs. composite
 - prime divide by only itself and I (has to be positive)
 - ▶ 0, I are not prime numbers
- Prime factorization is unique
 - fundamental theorem of arithmetic
 - Any integer greater than I can be written as a product of primes
 - $|2 = 2 \times 2 \times 3$
 - if I were a prime $12 = 1 \times 2 \times 2 \times 3 = 1 \times 1 \times 2 \times 2 \times 3$
- If GCD (a,b)=1, a and b are relatively prime






Modular Arithmetic

- Clock-face arithmetic
 - Modulo 12
- Remainder arithmetic
 - Think of this in the context of integer division
 - equivalent (mod n)
 - What is 7 + 11 (mod 12)?
 - ▶ 2 * 8 (mod 12)?
 - ► 52 (mod 12)?



Anything with the same remainder after division by the modulus n is considered





Some Math for Cryptography

- Any integer can be written like n = d.q + r
 - d = divisor, q = quotient, r = remainder
- Two integers are congruent mod-N if their differences is divisible by N
 - if a = p.N + r, and b = q.N+r, then (a-b) = (p-q)N
 - $a \equiv b \mod N$ (a is congruent to b w.r.t. modulo n)
 - \bullet a mod N = b mod N
- Modular Multiplicative inverse
 - a modular multiplicative inverse of an *integer a* is an *integer x* such that the product ax is congruent to I w.r.t modulus N.
 - $ax \equiv 1 \mod N$
 - $3x \equiv 1 \mod 10$???









Modular Inverse

- For an integer e, the inverse modulo n is the integer d such that $e^*d = 1$ (mod n)
 - Does not always exist!
- Examples
 - $\bullet 6 * d \equiv 1 \pmod{7}$
 - $\bullet 5 * d \equiv 1 \pmod{9}$
- Finding an inverse can be done efficiently





Euler's Totient Function


- Euler phi-function: for an integer n, $\Phi(n)$ is defined as the number of positive integers that are:
 - Less than n
 - Relatively prime to n
- Multiplicative
 - For integers a and b such that gcd(a,b) = I, $\varphi(ab) = \varphi(a) \varphi(b)$
- For any prime p, $\Phi(p) = p l$
 - Example: Find $\phi(55)$



Diffie-Helman Protocol

- For two participants p¹ and p²
- Setup: We pick a prime number p and a base g(<p)
 - This information is public
 - E.g., p=13, g=4
- Step I: Each principal picks a private value a (<p-1) and b (<p-1), respectively
- Step 2: Each principal generates and communicates a new value A, B respectively
- $A = g^a \mod p$, $B = g^b \mod p$
- Step 3: Each principal generates the secret shared key Z $s = A^b \mod p = g^{ab} \mod p$, $s = B^a \mod p = g^{ab} \mod p$ Perform a neighbor exchange.







A protocol run ...

Step 1) Alice picks x=4 Bob picks x=5

Step 2)

- Alice's $y = 6^{4} \mod 17 = 1296 \mod 17 = 4$
- Bob's $y = 6^{5} \mod 17 = 7776 \mod 17 = 7$

Step 3) Alice's $z = 7^4 \mod 17 = 2401 \mod 17 = 4$ Bob's $z = 4^5 \mod 17 = 1024 \mod 17 = 4$




Attacks on Diffie-Hellman

- This is key agreement, not authentication.
 - You really don't know anything about who you have exchanged keys with
 - ▶ The man in the middle ...

- Alice and Bob think they are talking directly to each other, but Mallory is actually performing two separate exchanges
- You need to have an authenticated DH exchange
 - The parties sign the exchanges (more or less)
 - See Schneier for a intuitive description







Key Distribution/Agreement

- Key Distribution is the process where we assign and transfer keys to a participant
 - Out of band (e.g., passwords, simple)
 - During authentication (e.g., Kerberos)
 - As part of communication (e.g., skip-encryption)
- Key Agreement is the process whereby two parties negotiate a key
 - 2 or more participants
- Typically, key distribution/agreement this occurs in conjunction with or after authentication.
 - However, many applications can pre-load keys







RSA (Rivest, Shamir, Adelman)


- A dominant public key algorithm
 - The algorithm itself is conceptually simple
 - Why it is secure is very deep (number theory)
 - Use properties of exponentiation modulo a product of large primes

"A Method for Obtaining Digital Signatures and Public Key Cryptosystems", Communications of the ACM, Feb., 1978, 21(2), pages 120-126.










RSA Key Generation

- Pick two large primes p and q
- Calculate n = pq
- Pick e such that it is relatively prime to phi(n) = (q-1)(p-1)
 - "Euler's Totient Function"
- d ~= e⁻¹ mod phi(n) or
 de mod phi(n) = I





- 2. n = 3*11 = 33
- 3. phi(n) = (2*10) = 204. e = 7 | GCD(20,7) = 1
- 5. "Euclid's Algorithm"
 d = 7⁻¹ mod 20
 d | d * 7 mod 20 = 1
 d = 3

RSA Encryption/Decryption

- Public key k⁺ is {e,n} and private key k⁻ is {d,n}
- Encryption and Decryption

- Example
 - Public key (7,33), Private Key (3,33)
 - Data "4" (encoding of actual data)
 - $E({7,33},4) = 4^7 \mod 33 = 16384 \mod 33 = 16$
 - $D({3,33},16) = 16^3 \mod 33 = 4096 \mod 33 = 4$





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E(k+,P) : ciphertext = plaintext^e mod n D(k-,C) : plaintext = ciphertext^d mod n

Encryption using private key ...

 Encryption and Decryption E(k,P) : ciphertext = plaintext^d mod n $D(k^+,C)$: plaintext = ciphertext^e mod n



- $E({3,33},4) = 4^3 \mod 33 = 64 \mod 33 = 31$
- $D({7,33},31) = 31^7 \mod 33 = 27,512,614,111 \mod 33 = 4$
- Q:What is RSA's trapdoor function and trapdoor?
- Q:Why encrypt with private key?






Why does RSA work?

- Difficult to find $\phi(n)$ or d using only e and n
- Finding d equivalent difficulty to factoring p*q
 - Classical problem worked on for centuries; no known reliable fast method
 - Example: Took 18 months to factor a 200 digit number into its 2 prime factors
- It is feasible to encrypt and decrypt because
 - It is possible to find large primes
 - It is possible to find coprimes and their inverses
 - Modular exponentiation is feasible



{e,n} is public information If you could factor n into p*q, then Could compute $\phi(n) = (p-1)(q-1)$ Could compute $d = e^{-1} \mod \phi(n)$ Would know the private key {d,n}!







"Textbook" RSA and Security

- What we've just seen is known as "textbook" RSA • RSA must be used with proper padding to prevent certain attacks (including
- chosen plaintext attacks)
- As we've used it here, NO integrity!
- RSA keys can be of any length
 - The current recommendation is that important keys should be at least 2048-bits in length
 - 1024 bit keys are ok for most uses, but you should feel nervous about them











Hybrid Cryptosystems

- In practice, public-key cryptography is used to secure and distribute session keys.
- These keys are used with symmetric algorithms for communication • Sender generates a random session key, encrypts it using receiver's public
- key and sends it
- Receiver decrypts the message to recover the session key Both encrypt/decrypt their communications using the same key
- Key is destroyed in the end

[E(K_{B+}, k) | E(k, m)]

k is the session key, sometimes called the ephemeral key



Bob's pubic / private key pair is (B+, B-)





Digital Signatures

- Models physical signatures in digital world
 - Association between private key and document
 - ... and indirectly identity and document.
 - Asserts that document is authentic and non-reputable
- To sign a document
 - Given document d, private key k-
 - Signature S(k, d) = E(k, h(d))
- Validation
 - ▶ Given document d, signature S(k⁻, d), public key k+
 - Validate $D(k^+, S(k^-, d)) = h(d)$





Digital Signatures

- A digital signature serves the same purpose as a real signature
 - It is a mark that only the sender can make
 - Other people can easily recognize it belonging to the sender
- Digital signatures must be:
 - Unforgeable: If Alice signs message M with signature S, it is impossible for someone else to produce the pair (M, S).
 - Authentic: If Bob receives the pair (M, S) and knows Alice's public key, he can check ("verify") that the signature is really from Alice







How can Alice sign a digital document?

- Digital document: M
- Since RSA is slow, hash M to compute digest h(M)
- Signature: Sigk-(M) = $E_{k-}(h(M)) = (h(M))d \mod n$
 - Since only Alice knows k-, only she can create the signature
- To verify: Verify (M,Sig_k(M))
 - Bob computes h(M) and compares it with Dk+(Sigk-(M))
 - Bob can compute $D_{k+}(Sigk-(M))$ since he knows k+ (Alice's public key)
 - If and only if they match, the signature is verified (otherwise, fails)

Alice's public / private key pair is (A+, A-)

[E(K_{B+}, k) | E Alice



Bob's pubic / private key pair is (B+, B-)



Birthday Attack and Signatures

- function's collision resistance
- Don't use MD5 or SHA1





• Since signatures depend on hash functions, they also depend on the hash





Properties of digital signature

- No forgery possible: No one can forge a message that is purportedly from Alice
- Authenticity check: If you get a signed message you should be able to verify that it's really from Alice
- No alteration/Integrity: No party can undetectably alter a signed message • Provides authentication, integrity, and non-repudiation (cannot deny having
- signed a signed message)















Non-Repudiation

- Which offers non-repudiation, and why?
 - HMAC: [m | HMAC(k, m)]
 - Digital Signature: [m | Sigk-(m)]





Using Public Key Crypto

- Suppose you (Alice) want to send a document securely to another party (Bob)
 - You have each others' public keys
 - Obtained in some secure fashion (PKI, later)
- How do you send the document such that only Bob can read it?
- How do you send the document such that Bob knows it is from Alice?















Cryptanalysis of RSA

- Survey by Dan Boneh
 - http://crypto.stanford.edu/~dabo/abstracts/RSAattack-survey.html
 - Real heavy math
- Results
 - Fascinating attacks have been developed
 - None devastating to RSA
- Cautions
 - Improper use
 - Secure implementation is non-trivial





Is RSA Secure?

- Premise: Breaking RSA == Factoring Large Integers
 - Factoring Large Integers is Hard
 - N=pq; if N is known, can we find p, q?
- Some Known (to cryptanalysts)
 - If (p-1)(q-1) is product of prime factors less than some number B
 - N can be factored in time less than B³
- Best Known Approach: General Number Field Sieve
 - Significant early application by Arjen Lenstra





Is RSA Secure?

- Fundamental tenet of cryptography
 - is secure
- RSA Laboratories challenge (Mar 1991)
 - Factor N into semiprimes (vary from 100 to 619 decimal digits).
 - Challenge ended in 2007
 - I6 of 54 listed numbers were factored
 - Current: up to 232 decimal digits factored
 - Using variations of "general number field sieve" algorithms



Lots of smart people have tried but not (yet) figured out how to break RSA => RSA





Misuse of RSA

- Common Modulus Misuse
 - Use the same N for all users
 - Since all have a private key for same N
 - Anyone can factor from their d and e
 - Exposing any d is same as factoring N
- Blinding Misuse
 - Suppose adversary wants you to
 - Sign an arbitrary message M
 - You don't sign
 - Adversary generates innocent M'
 - Where $M' = r^e M \mod N$
 - Adversary can generate M signature from M' signature





Review: secret vs. public key crypto.

- Secret key cryptography
 - Symmetric keys, where A single key (k) is used is used for E and D
 - D(E(p,k),k) = p
- All (intended) receivers have access to key
- Note: Management of keys determines who has access to encrypted data
 - E.g., password encrypted email
- Also known as symmetric key cryptography



Public key cryptography

Each key pair consists of a public and private component:

k+ (public key), k- (private key)

$$D(E(p, k+), k-) = p$$

- D(E(p, k-), k+) = p
- Public keys are distributed (typically) through public key certificates

-Anyone can communicate secretly with you if they have your certificate

– E.g., SSL-based web commerce



The symmetric/asymmetric key tradeoff

- Symmetric (shared) key systems
 - Efficient (Many MB/sec throughput)
 - Difficult key management
 - Kerberos
 - Key agreement protocols
- Asymmetric (public) key systems
 - Slow algorithms (so far ...)
 - Easy (easier) key management
 - PKI public key infrastructures
 - Webs of trust (PGP)





Neet Alice and Bob

- Alice and Bob are the canonical players in the cryptographic world.
 - They represent the end points of some interaction
 - Used to illustrate/define a security protocol
- Other players occasionally join ...
 - Syed trusted third party
 - Mallory malicious entity
 - Eve eavesdropper
 - van an issuer (of some object)







Some notation ...

- some notation like
 - All players are identified by their first initial
 - E.g., Alice=A, Bob=B
 - *d* is some data
 - pw^A is the password for A
 - k_{AB} is a symmetric key known to A and B
 - K_A^+, K_A^- is a public/private key pair for entity A
 - E(k,d) is encryption of data d with key k
 - H(d) is the hash of data d
 - $S(K_{A^{-}}, d)$ is the signature (using A's private key) of data d
 - "+" is used to refer to concatenation



• You will generally see protocols defined in terms of exchanges containing



Some interesting things you want to do ...

- ... when communicating.
 - Ensure the *authenticity* of a user
 - Ensure the integrity of the data
 - Also called data authenticity
 - Keep data confidential
 - Guarantee non-repudiation








Basic (User) Authentication

- Bob wants to authenticate Alice's identity
 - (is who she says she is)








Hash User Authentication

- Bob wants to authenticate Alice's identity
 - (is who she says she is)








Challenge/Response User Authentication

- Bob wants to authenticate Alice's identity
 - (is who she says she is)





User Authentication vs. Data Integrity

- - E.g., I know a password
- Data integrity ensures that the data transmitted...
 - Can be verified to be from an authenticated user
 - Can be verified to determine whether it has been modified



• Now, lets talk about the latter, data integrity





User authentication proves a property about the communicating parties



Simple Data Integrity?

Bob (integrity)

Alice

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• Alice wants to ensure any modification of the data in flight is detectable by

[d,h(d)]

Bob





HMAC Integrity

Bob (integrity)

[d,hmac(k,d)] Alice

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• Alice wants to ensure any modification of the data in flight is detectable by

Bob






Signature Integrity

Bob (integrity)

Alice



• Alice wants to ensure any modification of the data in flight is detectable by









Data Integrity vs. Non-repudiation

- If the integrity of the data is preserved, is it provably from that source?
 - HMAC integrity says what about non-repudiation?
 - Signature integrity says what about non-repudiation?









Confidentiality

Alice wants to ensure that the data is not exposed to anyone except the intended recipient (confidentiality)

$[E(k_{AB},d), hmac(k_{AB},d)]$

Alice

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Bob





Question

why don't I simply make up a key and send it to them?



• If I already have an authenticated channel (e.g., the remote party's public key),



Confidentiality

- \bullet
- But, Alice and Bob have *never met*!!!! \bullet

$[E(k_x,d), hmac(k_x,d),E(K_B^+,k_x)]$



Alice randomly selects key k_x to encrypt with



Alice wants to ensure that the data is not exposed to anyone except the intended recipient (confidentiality)

Bob

Key Distribution Revisited

- How do we distribute a key in an untrusted network?
 - Diffie-Hellman
 - Beware of Man-in-the-Middle Attacks
 - Public key
 - Offline and via certificates (more later)
 - What about without certs
 - Symmetric key
 - Offline
 - How about online?







Needham-Schroeder

- Goal
 - Two parties want to communicate securely
- Threat Model
 - Network is untrusted
 - Other nodes may be untrusted
- Requirements
 - Mutual Authentication
 - Prove that only the appropriate parties hold secrets
- Assumptions
 - Trusted Third Party






N-S Protocol Detail

- Message I: A --> S : A,B, R_A [N=R=nonce-random value]
 - A asks TTP S for a session key for A and B to use
- Message 2: $S \rightarrow A : \{R_A, B, K_{AB}, \{K_{AB}, A\}_{BS}\}_{AS}$
 - S returns messages for A that includes the session key
 - And a message for A to give to B
- Message 3: $A \rightarrow B : \{K_{AB}, A\}_{BS}, \{R_{A2}\}_{AB}$
 - A passes "ticket" on to B
- Message 4: $B --> A : \{R_B\}_{AB}$
 - B asks A to demonstrate knowledge of K_{AB} through N_B
- Message 5: A --> B : {R_B-I}_{AB}
 - A does!



N-S Protocol

• For Symmetric Key Cryptosystems





The Needham-Schroeder Authentication Protocol

Needham-Schroeder Public Key

- Message a.I: $A \rightarrow B : A,B, \{N_A,A\}_{PKB}$
 - A initiates protocol with fresh value for B
- Message a.2: $B \rightarrow A : B,A, \{N_A, N_B\}_{PKA}$
 - B demonstrates knowledge of N_A and challenges A
- Message a.3: $A \rightarrow B : A,B, \{N_B\}_{PKB}$
 - A demonstrates knowledge of N_B
- A and B are the only ones who can read N_A and N_B

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Needham%E2%80%93Schroeder protocol





Nonce

A Protocol Story

- Needham-Schroeder Public Key Protocol
 - Defined in 1978
- Assumed Correct
 - Many years without a flaw being discovered
- Proven Correct
 - BAN Logic (early 1990s)
- So, It's Correct, Right?





Gavin Lowe Attack

- An active intruder X participates...
- Message a.I: $A \rightarrow X : A, X, \{N_A, A\}_{PKX}$
- Message b.I: $X(A) \rightarrow B : A,B, \{N_A,A\}_{PKB}$
 - X as A initiates protocol with fresh value for B
- Message b.2: $B \to X(A) : B,A, \{N_A, N_B\}_{PKA}$
- Message a.2: $X \to A : X, A, \{N_A, N_B\}_{PKA}$
 - X asks A to demonstrates knowledge of N_B
- Message a.3: $A \rightarrow X : A, X, \{N_B\}_{PKX}$
 - A tells X N_B; thanks A!
- Message b.3: X(A) --> В : А,В, {N_B}_{РКВ}
 - X completes the protocol as A



A, A}PKX {NA, A}PKB alue for B {NA, NB}PKA A, NB}PKA e of NB

What Happened?

• What is the cause of this attack?






What Happened?

- X can get A to act as an "oracle" for nonces
 - ► Hey A, what's the N_B in this message from any B?
- A assumes that any message encrypted for it is legit
 - Bad idea
- X can enable multiple protocol executions to be interleaved
 - Should be part of the threat model



or nonces from any B? pted for it is legit



The Fix

- It's Trivial (find it)
- Message a.I: $A \rightarrow B : A,B, \{N_A,A\}_{PKB}$
 - A initiates protocol with fresh value for B
- Message a.2: $B \to A : B,A, \{N_A, N_B, B\}_{PKA}$
 - B demonstrates knowledge of N_A and challenges A
- Message a.3: A --> B : A,B, {N_B}_{PKB}
 - A demonstrates knowledge of N_B



Impact on Protocol Analysis

- Protocol Analysis Took a Black Eye
 - BAN Logic Is Insufficient
 - BAN Logic Is Misleading
- Protocol Analysis Became a Hot Topic
 - Lowe's FDR
 - Meadow's NRL Analyzer
 - Millen's Interrogator
 - Rubin's Non-monotonic protocols
 -
- In the end, could find known flaws, but...
 - Attacker model is too complex





Dolev-Yao Result

- Strong attacker model
 - Attacker intercepts every message
 - Attacker can cause operators to be applied at any time
 - Operators for modifying, generating any kind of message
 - Attacker can apply any operator except other's decryption
- Theoretical Results
 - Polynomial Time for One Session
 - Undecidable for Multiple Sessions
 - Moral: Protocol Validation is Difficult Because Attacker Can Exploit Interactions of Multiple Sessions









Real Systems Security

- some variant of these constructs.
 - So, get to know them ... they are your friends
 - We will see them (and a few more) over the semester

- They also apply to systems construction
 - Protocols need not necessarily be online
 - Think about how you would use these constructs to secure files on a disk drive (integrity, authenticity, confidentiality)
 - We will add some other tools, but these are the basics



• The reality of the security is that 90% of the frequently used protocols use





